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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PUTTING THE BRAKES ON CONSUMER DRIVEN MEDICAID: THE
FAILURES AND HARMS OF HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN (HIP) 2.0

SIDNEY D. WATSON*
ABSTRACT
In January 2015, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
granted Indiana a Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver to experiment with
consumer driven Medicaid. The Healthy Indiana Plan (HIP) 2.0 combines a
$2,500 high deductible with a Personal Responsibility and Wellness (POWER)
Account, premiums, and copays. Described as “the most significant departure
from traditional Medicaid ever approved,” Indiana claims that the POWER
Account, the signature feature of HIP 2.0, is “similar to a health savings account
(HSA)” and encourages members to be more cost-conscious consumers, helps
familiarize members with how commercial health insurance works, and
encourages continuous Medicaid enrollment.
This article explains how and why POWER Accounts and HIP 2.0 fail on all
counts: The POWER Account does not encourage members to comparison shop
and be more cost-conscious consumers. Neither does it help educate Medicaid
enrollees about how commercial insurance works because the POWER Account
is nothing like a commercial HSA. Most troubling, though, POWER Account
premiums create significant barriers to Medicaid coverage. Nearly 60,000
Hoosiers have lost Medicaid coverage because of missed POWER Account
premiums and another 300,000 have been moved to more costly, less
comprehensive Medicaid plans because of their inability to meet the POWER
Account premium requirement.
HHS used its authority under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act to grant
Indiana a waiver to conduct HIP 2.0 as an “experimental, pilot, or
demonstration” project likely to promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act.
HHS was wrong. Consumer driven Medicaid does not promote the objectives of
the Medicaid Act. Indiana’s HIP 2.0 waiver experiment proves that consumer
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driven Medicaid suppresses enrollment by creating administrative and financial
barriers to coverage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2015, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
granted Indiana a Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver to experiment with
consumer driven Medicaid. 1 The experimental Healthy Indiana Plan (HIP) 2.0
combines a $2,500 high deductible with a Personal Responsibility and Wellness
(POWER) Account, premiums, and copays. Described as “the most significant
departure from traditional Medicaid ever approved,” 2 Indiana claims that the
POWER Account, the signature feature of HIP 2.0, is “similar to a health savings
account (HSA)” and encourages members to be more cost-conscious consumers,
helps familiarize members with how commercial health insurance works, and
encourages continuous Medicaid enrollment. 3
This article explains how and why POWER Accounts and HIP 2.0 fail on
all counts: The POWER Account does not encourage members to comparison
shop and be more cost-conscious consumers. 4 Neither does it help educate
Medicaid enrollees about how commercial insurance works because the
POWER Account is nothing like a commercial HSA. 5 Most troubling, though,
POWER Account premiums create significant barriers to Medicaid coverage.
Nearly 60,000 Hoosiers have lost Medicaid coverage because of missed
POWER Account premiums and another 300,000 have been moved to more
costly, less comprehensive Medicaid plans because of their inability to meet the
POWER Account premium requirement. 6
Section II of this article discusses the theory and research on consumer
driven health care and consumer driven health plans. In theory, consumer driven
health care shifts costs away from insurance and onto patients so they will be
more careful and prudent users of health services and reduce health care
spending. Section II explains the challenges of moving consumer driven health
care theory into practice. It ends with a discussion of the concerns that arise
about trying to import consumer driven health care into Medicaid.
Section III describes the POWER Accounts, premiums and other
components of HIP 2.0 intended to transform Indiana’s Medicaid coverage into
consumer driven health care. Section IV shows why POWER Accounts are

1. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN (HIP) 2.0-SPECIAL
TERMS & CONDITIONS NO. 11-W- 00296/5 1 (2015). For a complete chronology of the HIP 2.0
waivers, see Medicaid Expansion in Indiana, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.k
ff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaid-expansion-in-indiana/.
2. Seema Verma & Brian Neale, Healthy Indiana 2.0 Is Challenging Medicaid Norms,
HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160829.0
56228/full/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
3. Id.; see IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HIP 2.0 1115 WAIVER APPLICATION 4 (July
2, 2014), https://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_2_0_Waiver_(Final).pdf.
4. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
5. See discussion infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 160–165.
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unlike anything offered in the commercial market and more likely to confuse
consumers than help them make the transition to private insurance coverage. It
explains why POWER Accounts are a pale imitation of consumer driven health
care that are highly unlikely to encourage patients to be more cost-conscious
consumers.
Section V reviews the available data evaluating Indiana’s HIP 2.0 waiver
experiment. While data is limited, it appears that HIP 2.0 is creating more
confusion than consumer empowerment. Most troubling are the barriers that
POWER Account premiums have created. HIP 2.0 has not only failed to
“encourage[ ] continuous Medicaid enrollment,” 7 it has resulted in disruptions
in coverage far beyond anything reported in traditional Medicaid.
HHS used its authority under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act to
grant Indiana a waiver to conduct HIP 2.0 as an “experimental, pilot, or
demonstration” project likely to promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act. 8
HHS was wrong. Consumer driven Medicaid does not promote the objectives of
the Medicaid Act. Indiana’s HIP 2.0 waiver experiment proves that consumer
driven Medicaid suppresses enrollment by creating administrative and financial
barriers to coverage. 9
II. CONSUMER DRIVEN HEALTH CARE & CONSUMER DRIVEN HEALTH PLANS:
THEORY & RESEARCH
Consumer driven health care is animated by the concern that health
insurance shelters patients from the true cost of health care resulting in them
using more care than is necessary and increasing the cost of health care and
health insurance. 10 Consumer driven health care posits that making patients bear
more of the cost of health care should prompt them to turn down high cost, low
value care, and encourage providers to compete by offering both lower cost and

7. Verma & Neale, supra note 2. Indiana’s waiver applications and other descriptions of HIP
2.0 and the POWER Account all described it as “like an HSA” or “similar to a[n] HSA.” See IND.
FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 3, at 4. The waiver application claims these programs
engage participants in their health care decisions, provide new coverage pathways, and support
transition to commercial health insurance. See id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2016).
9. Elsewhere, I have argued that HHS does not have authority under Section 1115 to impose
premium requirements like the POWER Account fees. See Sidney D. Watson, Premiums and
Section 1115 Waivers: What Cost Medicaid Expansion?, 9 ST. LOUIS UNIV. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
265, 269 (2016). This article focuses on a separate issue of whether HIP 2.0 waivers further the
objective of the Medicaid Act.
10. Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical Consumers,
96 GEO. L.J. 583, 586 (2008); James C. Robinson & Paul B. Ginsberg, Consumer-Driven Health
Care: Promise and Performance, 28 HEALTH AFF. 272, 272 (2009). This phenomenon is often
referred to as a “moral hazard.” See Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to
Put Skin Back in the Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 939 (2013).
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higher quality care. 11 As Wendy Epstein puts it, “The premise is basic
economics: a patient who must spend more of his or her own money (rather than
the insurance company’s money) should consume less care, particularly if it is
unnecessary care.” 12
Consumer driven health care uses a variety of cost sharing approaches to
make consumers pay more out of their own pockets and thus have more “skin in
the game.” 13 Raising copays or coinsurance to increase the patient’s costs at the
point of service is one option. Higher deductibles that should make the patient
act more like an uninsured patient until the deductible is met is another.
Consumer driven health plans, both HSAs and Health Reimbursement Accounts
(HRAs), are another variant that combine high deductibles, tax benefits and
savings accounts. 14
HSAs couple a high deductible health insurance plan with a tax-sheltered
interest-bearing savings account that can be used to pay for medical and nonmedical expenses. 15 HSAs are owned by the patient and unused balances can be
carried over from year to year without limit. 16 Both patients and their employers
can contribute to the HSA with pre-tax dollars. The high deductible is intended
to expose patients to the costs of care and incentivize them to use medical

11. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 645 (2008); see also William M. Sage,
Assembled Products: The Key to More Effective Competition and Antitrust Oversight in Health
Care, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 635 n.108, 690 (2016); Srishti Miglani, Reference Pricing: A
Small and Mighty Solution to Bend the Health Care Cost Curve, 22 CONN. INS. L.J. 47, 52 (2016)
(explaining both the theory and the role the RAND Health Insurance Experiment played in the
development of the theory).
12. Wendy N. Epstein, Price Transparency and Incomplete Contracts in Health Care, 67
EMORY L.J. 1, 27 (2017).
13. See id. (cataloguing approaches that fall under the term “consumer-driven health care” or
“consumerism”).
14. CAROL RAPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21573, TAX-ADVANTAGED ACCOUNTS
FOR HEALTH CARE EXPENSES: SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON 1, 4–5 (2013). Medical Savings
Accounts are another form of CDHP plan that pre-dated HSAs, but new MSAs may not be set up
after December 2007. Id. at 5.
15. 26 U.S.C. § 223 (2016) (defining an HSA); Id. § 223(c)(2)(A) (providing the Internal
Revenue Service’s definition of “high-deductible plan”); Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement
and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108–173, tit. XII, § 223, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1305) (authorizing HSAs). In 2017, the deductible must be at least $1,300 for selfonly coverage and $2,600 for family coverage. Norton Francis et al., The Tax Policy Briefing Book:
A Citizens’ Guide to the Tax System and Tax Policy 1257 (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.tax
policycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/tpc-briefing-book_0.pdf. In 2017, “HSA
contributions are limited to $3,400 for self-only coverage and $6,750 for a family.” Id.
Additionally, “[a]ccount holders age 55 or older can contribute an additional $1,000.” Id. Both the
deductible amount and HSA contribution limit are indexed annually, growing for inflation. Id.
16. Id.
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services more appropriately. 17 The savings account is designed to encourage
patients to spend less on health expenses by allowing patients to retain unused
money in the HSA from year-to-year to use as they see fit, for either medical or
non-medical purposes. 18 HSA plans are available in both the employer and
individual markets, although ninety percent of people with HSAs have employer
sponsored coverage. 19
HRAs are employer-established tax-sheltered accounts that are attached to
an employer health plan. 20 Unlike an HSA, the employer owns and controls the
HRA. 21 The employer funds the HRA and employee contributions are not
permitted. The employer determines which medical expenses can be reimbursed
from the HRA and can limit the amount of unused funds that can be carried over
from year-to-year. 22 In actuality, HRAs are really “arrangements” rather than
accounts. The employer only moves money into an account to pay claims as they
come due. No account is pre-funded as is the case with HSAs. 23
Most employers do not allow employees to take unused HRA money when
they change jobs or retire. 24 HRAs typically use a high deductible to expose
patients to the costs of care to incentivize them to use medical services more
appropriately. 25 However, HRAs do not create as strong a spend-less-to-savemore incentive as HSAs do because employers limit how much HRA money can
17. See Lindsey F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s
Interest in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 851–52 (2016).
18. Francis et al. supra note 15, at 257. Withdrawals for non-qualifying medical expenses are
subject to income tax and a twenty percent penalty, but the penalty is waived for individuals who
are disabled, age sixty-five or older, or deceased. Id. HSAs are particularly attractive to high-wage
workers who max out on their IRA contributions and use HSAs as an additional means of taxpreferred saving. Id.
19. See 2016 Survey of Health Savings Accounts-High Deductible Plans, AM.’S HEALTH INS.
PLANS 4 fig. 2 (2016), https://www.ahip.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2016_HSASurvey_
Draft_2.14.17.pdf.
20. RAPAPORT, supra note 14, at 3. HRAs began as stand-alone accounts that offered an
alternative to traditional health insurance coverage, making the patient responsible for medical
costs beyond the HRA. See id. at 4. Now that the Affordable Care Act prohibits an annual cap on
health insurance benefits and imposes an annual limit on patient out-of-pocket liability, HRAs must
be coupled with employer sponsored health insurance for medical costs above the HRA amount.
Id. at 5.
21. Francis et al., supra note 15, at 264.
22. RAPAPORT, supra note 14, at 3–4.
23. Francis et al. supra note 15, at 264.
24. See Paul Fronstin & M. Christopher Roebuck, Health Care Spending after Adopting a
Full-Replacement, High-Deductible Health Plan with a Health Savings Account: A Five-Year
Study, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1, 3–4 (2013), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_0713.No388.HSAs.pdf; RAPAPORT, supra note 14, at 4 (explaining employers may, but are not
required to, allow employees to keep unused HRA money when they leave employment).
25. Paul Fronstin, Health Savings Accounts and Other Account-Based Health Plans, EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST. 4, 8 (2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=599942 (explaining that HRAs are
usually partnered with a high deductible plan but can be offered with lower deductible plans, too).
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be carried over, the purposes for which it can be used, and typically do not allow
employees to keep money when they leave the employer.
Although enrollment in HSAs and HRAs has increased since they were
introduced in 2005, they are not the predominate form of commercial insurance
in either the employer or individual health insurance markets. Less than one
quarter of employees are enrolled in plans with HSAs or HRAs. 26 Only six
percent of employers offer HSAs or HRAs as the only option for coverage. 27 In
the individual market, high deductible plans have exploded but relatively few
people combine them with an HSA. 28
HSAs have become a savings mechanism as much as, or maybe even more
than, a health care financing tool. The people most likely to have HSAs are high
income earners, those with incomes over $200,000 a year, who favor them
because they offer tax-sheltered savings. 29
Critics of consumer directed health plans point out that while the linchpin of
consumer directed health plans is encouraging patients to comparison shop, find
less expensive care and forgo unnecessary care, patients find this virtually
impossible to do. 30 Medical prices are not transparent. 31 Patients’ treatment
decisions are highly influenced by physician treatment recommendations. 32
Many, if not most, treatment decisions are made under urgent and emotionally-

26. Paul Fronstin, What Do We Really Know About Consumer-Driven Health Plans?, EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST. 1, 23 (2010), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_08-2010_No345_
CDHP.pdf.
27. Gary Claxton et al., Employer Health Benefits 2017 Annual Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
3, 7 (2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-Annual-Survey2017.
28. AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, supra note 19, at 4.
29. HSAs are most attractive to higher income people because of their tax advantages. Francis
et al. supra note 15, at 257–58. Both employees and employers can contribute to the HSA. Id.
Contributions made by the account owner can be deducted from their adjusted gross income. Id.
Contributions by the employer are exempt for income and payroll taxes. Id. Interest earned on the
HSA funds accrue tax-free, and withdrawals for qualifying medical expenses are not taxed. Id.
Withdrawals for non-qualifying expenses are subject to income tax and a twenty percent penalty,
but the penalty is waived for individuals who are disabled, age sixty-five or older, or who have
died. Id. HSAs are particularly attractive to high-wage workers who max out on their IRA
contributions and use HSAs as an additional means of tax-preferred savings. Id.
30. See Ateev Mehrotra et al., Americans Support Price Shopping for Health Care, But Few
Actually Seek Out Price Information, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1392, 1399 (2017) (finding in a national
survey of patients little evidence of price shopping because of the difficulty of finding price
information and the desire not to disrupt existing provider-patient relationships); Erin C. Fuse
Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 107–08 (2015)
(synopsizing the literature that identifies barriers that prevent patients from engaging in the
consumer behavior that consumer-driven health plans seek to promote); Wiley, supra note 17, at
851–53 (discussing these and other criticisms of consumer-directed health plans).
31. Epstein, supra note 12, at 3, 4.
32. Hall & Schneider, supra note 11, at 652.
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charged conditions which are not conducive to price shopping. 33 The line
between necessary and unnecessary care is often blurred, particularly when it
comes to medical testing. 34
Studies show that most consumers simply do not understand how their
consumer directed health plans operate or the economic incentives they are
intended to create. In general, consumers have high levels of health insurance
illiteracy and fail to understand how deductibles, HSAs, coinsurance and
copayments work. 35 HSAs in particular tend to have complicated designs where
some services require a deductible or coinsurance payment from the HSA while
others do not, creating widespread consumer confusion about which services
they are encouraged to use and which they should approach more cautiously. 36
Research confirms skepticism that HSAs will not dramatically reduce health
care spending. While a number of studies report striking savings the first year
an employer offers an HSA, savings erode quickly and decline to the six to seven
percent range by year three. 37
Research also confirms that cost savings from consumer directed health
plans result from patients reducing spending on necessary and appropriate
care—specifically medication for chronic diseases, physician office visits and

33. See id. at 658; see also Ani B. Satz, Fragmentation After Health Care Reform, 15 HOUS.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 173, 193–95 (2015) (discussing the overall difficulty patients have when
making complex medical choices).
34. Mary Reed et al., High-Deductible Health Insurance Plans: Efforts to Sharpen a Blunt
Instrument, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1145, 1145, 1150 (2009).
35. Id. at 1145.
36. See Jeffrey T. Kullgren et al., Health Care Use and Decision Making Among LowerIncome Families in High-Deductible Health Plans, 170 JAMA 1918, 1918 (2010); Mary E. Reed
et al., In Consumer-Directed Health Plans, A Majority of Patients Were Unaware of Free or LowCost Preventive Care, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2641, 2641-42 (2012); Reed et al., supra note 34, at 1145.
37. See Amelia M. Haviland et al., Do “Consumer-Directed” Health Plans Bend the Cost
Curve Over Time?, 46 J. HEALTH ECON. 33, 42 (2016). Introduction of the HSA reduced total
spending by twenty-five percent in the first year, but HSA spending rebounded in later years
showing only a six percent decrease over three years. Fronstin & Roebuck, supra note 24, at 5, 8.
Moreover, the comparison group, which was composed of workers covered by traditional health
insurance, had an increase in spending of twenty-nine percent in the first year, which may have
caused the study to overstate the savings from the adoption of the HSA. Id. at 5, 12; see Stephen T.
Parente et al., Evaluation of the Effect of a Consumer-Driven Health Plan on Medical Care
Expenditures and Utilization, 39 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1189, 1201, 1205–06 (2004) (stating that
CDHP enrollees had lower total expenditures than enrollees in PPO, but higher than HMO enrollees
after a two-year period, controlling for a variety of enrollee characteristics. HRA resulted in higher
spending for hospital and physician services but had no impact on prescription drug spending);
Anthony T. Lo Sasso et al., Health Savings Accounts and Health Care Spending, 45 HEALTH
SERVS. RES. 1041, 1056 (2010) (stating that enrollees in HSAs spent approximately five to seven
percent less than the enrollees in traditional health plan, with most spending reduction occurring in
the first year).
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preventive care. 38 In fact, one recent study found that consumer directed health
plans produce no change in spending on unnecessary care, services that have
unclear or no clinical benefit to the patient. 39
Studies substantiate that the consumer driven health plans that produce the
greatest cost savings are those with the highest deductibles and lowest HSA or
HRA contribution from employers. 40 In short, consumer directed health plans
that put the most consumer “skin in the game” produce the greatest savings. 41
As one employer warns, “Should you get sick or injured and need significant
medical care, you’ll pay a lot more out of pocket [with our HSA plan] than you
would with a traditional plan.” 42 These high deductible plans also shift more
costs of medical care to the patients, and leave patients with medical debt and
the threat of a medical bankruptcy when they get sicker and do not have their
own funds to cover the deductible amounts through the HSA account or
otherwise. 43

38. Rajender Agarwal et al., High-Deductible Health Plans Reduce Health Care Cost and
Utilization, Including Use of Needed Preventive Services, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1762, 1762 (2017); see
also M. Kate Bundorf, Consumer-Directed Health Plans: A Review of the Evidence, 83 J. RISK INS.
9, 27 (2016) (discussing studies that show consumer-directed health plans prompt worrisome
reductions in drug adherence among patients with chronic conditions, particularly those who have
asymptomatic conditions like hypertension and high cholesterol).
39. Rachel O. Reid et al., Impact of Consumer-Directed Health Plans on Low-Value
Healthcare, 23 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 741, 741 (2017) (while consumer-directed health plans do
reduce overall health care spending, they do not reduce spending on low-value services that provide
unclear or no benefit to patients).
40. Id. at 29.
41. Skin in the Game: How Consumer-Directed Plans Affect the Cost and Use of Health Care,
RAND HEALTH 1 (June 28, 2012), file:///Users/Owner/Downloads/RAND_RB9672.pdf; Karen
Davis, Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will It Improve Health System Performance?, 39 HEALTH
SERVS. RES. 1219, 1219 (2004); Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health
Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 119–20 (2005).
42. How Consumer-Directed Health Plans Work, UNIV. WASH. HUMAN RES., http://hr.uw.
edu/benefits/insurance/health/compare-plans/how-consumer-directed-health-plans-work/ (last
visited Apr. 16, 2018).
43. In 2017, the average deductible for single coverage was $2,433 for an employer-sponsored
HSA and $2,129 for an HRA plan, and one out of four workers had a deductible of $3,000 or more.
GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2017 ANNUAL
SURVEY: HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS WITH SAVINGS OPTION 139 (2017), https://www.kf
f.org/health-costs/report/2017-employer-health-benefits-survey/. HSA plans must have a
deductible of at least $1,300 for self-only coverage and $2,600 for family coverage. Francis et al.
supra note 15, at 2. Almost half of firms offering HSAs do not contribute to the HSA. CLAXTON
ET AL., supra, at fig. 8.8. Only two percent of workers with a HSA and twenty-one percent of
workers with a HRA received an account contribution from their employer at least equal to their
deductible. Another thirty percent of workers with a HSA and thirty percent of workers with a HRA
received employer account contributions that, if applied to their deductible, would reduce it to less
than $1,000. Id. at 139.
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High deductibles and high cost sharing carry health risks for Medicaid
patients. 44 The 1982 RAND Health Insurance Experiment provided early
support for consumer driven health care theory by showing that increasing
patient cost sharing for moderate and higher income patients reduces health care
spending but results in similar health outcomes. 45 However, that study also
found that cost sharing for low income patients created barriers to care, causing
poor patients to forgo needed and necessary medical care. 46
Decades of research confirms that for patients living at or near the poverty
level even a small amount of “skin in the game,” cost sharing in the range
between one and five dollars, reduces the use of necessary and essential
services. 47 Cost sharing has been shown to create barriers to a wide assortment
of medically necessary care including vaccinations, prescription drugs, mental
health visits, preventive care, primary care, and inpatient and outpatient care. 48
Premiums, too have been shown to create substantial barriers to obtaining and
maintaining Medicaid enrollment for low-income adults and children. 49
Thus, Congress has limited states’ ability to impose consumer driven health
driven plans on Medicaid patients. Federal Medicaid law provides that Medicaid
44. They also carry financial risks. See Gery P. Guy Jr., The Effects of Cost Sharing on Access
to Care among Childless Adults, 45 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1720, 1722 (2010). Most patients do not
have savings to cover the costs of a high deductible. Reed Abelson, Is High-Deductible Health
Insurance Worth the Risk?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/
business/is-high-deductible-health-insurance-worth-the-risk.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).
Thus, employers who do not fully fund an HSA or an HRA leave employees at risk of medical debt
and even bankruptcy. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HEALTH SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS AND THE STATES 4 (Oct. 10, 2017).
45. See Michael E. Chernew & Joseph P. Newhouse, Commentary, What Does the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment Tell Us About the Impact of Patient Cost Sharing on Health
Outcomes?, 14 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 412, 412 (July 2008); see also Robert H. Brook et al., The
Health Insurance Experiment: A Classic RAND Study Speaks to the Current Health Care Reform
Debate RAND HEALTH 1, 3 (2006), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs
/2006/RAND_RB9174.pdf. The original RAND Study found that high deductible plans with high
cost sharing led to much lower average spending—on average twenty-five to thirty percent less—
than plans with no out-of-pocket expenses aside from the premiums. Id. at 2. Later studies have
found that these kinds of savings cannot be sustained over time. See infra notes 48–50 and
accompanying text.
46. JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & INS. EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE
RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 246 (1996).
47. Samantha Artiga et al., The Effects of Premiums and Cost Sharing on Low-Income
Populations: Updated Review of Research Findings, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 4 (2017), http://files.k
ff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Effects-of-Premiums-and-Cost-Sharing-on-Low-Income-Popu
lations.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5; see also David Machledt & Jane Perkins, Medicaid Premiums and Cost Sharing,
NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM 1, 15 (Mar. 26, 2014), file:///Users/Owner/Downloads/NHeLP_
IssueBriefMedicaidCostSharing_03262014.pdf (reviewing research literature on cost sharing and
premiums for low income populations).
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enrollees with incomes below 150% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) cannot
be charged premiums or deductibles, and copays or co-insurance must be within
limits prescribed by statute and implementing regulations. 50 Copays and coinsurance are prohibited for pregnant women, children, and most emergency
room use. 51 Where copays are permissible, those with incomes under 100% FPL
can only be charged “nominal” copays of no more than four dollars for most
outpatient services, seventy-five dollars for inpatient care. 52 Those with incomes
between 100–150% FPL can be charged up to ten percent of the cost of both
inpatient and outpatient services. 53 Both groups can be charged up to eight
dollars for non-preferred drugs and non-emergency use of the emergency
room. 54 Federal rules cap combined costs for premiums and cost sharing at five
percent household income, calculated on a monthly or quarterly basis, at state
option. 55
Indiana’s Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 waiver allows the state to ignore these
federal limits on premiums and deductibles so it can experiment with consumer
directed Medicaid. What does Indiana’s consumer directed Medicaid look like?
III. CONSUMER DRIVEN MEDICAID IN INDIANA: HIP 2.0, POWER ACCOUNTS
AND PREMIUMS
Consumer directed Medicaid is not new in Indiana. In 2007, the Bush
Administration approved a Section 1115 demonstration waiver for the first
version of HIP that allowed Indiana to use federal Medicaid funds to pay for a
limited benefit package for a capped number of working adults earning up to
100% FPL. 56 HIP was touted as a model of consumer directed health care
because coverage included a $1,100 deductible coupled with a $1,100 POWER
Account. 57 Indiana claimed the experiment was a success, but costs were
significantly higher than anticipated, and the state never released either their own
data or outside evaluations by which the experiment could be appraised. 58

50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396o-1 (b)(1)(B)(ii) (2010). Regulations are codified at 42 C.F.R.
447.52–447.56 (2018).
51. 42 C.F.R. § 447.56(a) (2018).
52. Id. § 447.52.
53. Id. §§ 447.52, 447.54.
54. Id. § 447.53.
55. Id. § 447.56(f).
56. Healthy Indiana Plan: Key Facts and Issues, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (2008), https://kaiser
familyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7786.pdf.
57. See Id.
58. Laura D. Hermer & Merle Lenihan, The Future of Medicaid Supplemental Payments: Can
They Promote Patient-Centered Care?, 102 KY. L.J. 287, 309–11 (2014).
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In January 2015, after more than a year of negotiation, the Obama
administration granted Indiana a Section 1115 waiver for HIP 2.0. 59 Indiana
expanded its Medicaid program to cover the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)
expansion group, working age adults ages nineteen through sixty-four with
incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level, or $16,040 for a single
person. 60 Under the terms of the demonstration waiver, the Centers for Medicaid
and Medicare Services (CMS) waived federal Medicaid rules limiting cost
sharing, deductibles and premiums to allow Indiana to enroll new ACA eligible
adults, low-income parents and pregnant women in HIP 2.0, a suite of consumer
driven health plans that combine a $2,500 high deductible with a POWER
Account. 61 The original HIP 2.0 waiver was for three years, through January
2018. 62 In February 2018 CMS granted Indiana a waiver extension continuing
most components of HIP 2.0 through December 2020, adding some new
premium provisions and a controversial new work requirement. 63 This article
describes HIP 2.0 as it exists in early 2018.
HIP 2.0 offers two types of consumer directed health plans, PLUS and
BASIC, both of which have a $2,500 deductible combined with a $2,500
POWER Account. 64 PLUS plans cover more benefits and require a monthly
59. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 1, at 1; Letter from Eric J.
Holcomb, Governor of Indiana, to the Honorable Norris Cochran, Acting Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, Healthy Indiana Plan § 1115 Waiver Extension 1 (Jan.
31, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/
1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-demo-app-02152
017.pdf. The formal waiver application was filed with CMS on February 14, 2017.
60. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 1, at 1.
61. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 1, at 1–2, 17; see also CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NO. 11-W-00296/5, HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN: SPECIAL TERMS
AND CONDITIONS (2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20ca.pdf [hereinafter CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018].
Pregnant women were not included in HIP 2.0 in the 2015 waiver but were added by the 2018
waiver. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 1, at 9; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra, at 2.
62. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra note
61, at 1.
63. Id. at 3–5. The most notable change in 2018 was the addition of a work requirement, a
condition of eligibility beyond the scope of this article. Hermer & Lenihan, supra note 58, at 309–
11. Another important change not beyond the scope of this article is a new provision dis-enrolling
most adults who do not timely complete their eligibility renewal process and locking them out of
coverage for three months. Id. at 26. For a comparison of the 2015 and 2017 waivers, see MaryBeth
Musumeci et al., Approved Changes in Indiana’s Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver Extension,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/approved-changesin-indianas-section-1115-medicaid-waiver-extension/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).
64. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra note
61, at 19–20. All plans meet the minimum coverage standards under the ACA covering the ten
essential health benefits. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0 1115
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premium, 65 but have no copays except for non-emergency use of the emergency
room. 66 BASIC plans cover fewer benefits and have no monthly premium, but
impose copays for most services. 67
All HIP 2.0 members are enrolled in one of four HMO networks managed
by a private insurance company. 68 The HMO administers the POWER accounts,
sends members monthly notices of their POWER Account balance and copay
charges, collects monthly premiums and terminates or changes coverage for
those who fail to pay their premiums. 69
The POWER Account pays for the first $2,500 of Medicaid-covered
services provided by in-network providers. 70 The POWER Account cannot be
used to pay cost sharing or for services not covered by HIP 2.0. 71 To incentivize

WAIVER APPLICATION, INDIANA FAMILY AND SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 56 (July 2,
2014). About ten percent of enrollees are determined to be medically frail and thus eligible for the
State Plan PLUS or State Plan Basic offerings. See LEWIN GROUP, INDIANA HEALTHY INDIANA
PLAN 2.0: INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT 1 (2016), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chipprogram-information/by-topics/waivers/1115/downloads/in/healthy-indiana-plan-2/in-healthy-in
diana-plan-support-20-interim-evl-rpt-07062016.pdf. The State Plan options have the most
generous benefit package including non-emergency medical transportation, nursing home care, and
home and community-based services. Id. at 9 tbl. 1. People who are medically frail and eligible for
State Plan coverage do not lose coverage for failure to pay their PLUS Power fee. Id. at 44.
65. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra note
61, at 5 (Indiana calls this a “POWER Account contribution” or “PAC”). However, this article
refers to these as “fees” or “payments” because “contribution” is defined as a gift or donation. See
id. These payments are required premiums that are deposited into the POWER Account. Id. at 2.
66. Id. PLUS plans include vision, dental, and chiropractic care and has higher caps on certain
services like physical therapy. Id. HIP Plus members can get 90-day refills on prescriptions and
receive medication by mail order. Healthy Indiana Plan Member Handbook, ANTHEM BLUECROSS
BLUESHIELD 46 (2016), https://mss.anthem.com/in/inin_caid_hip_memberhandbook_eng.pdf.
Healthy Indiana Plan: Frequently Asked Questions, IN.GOV (2018), https://secure.in.gov/fssa/hip/
2452.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2018). Those whom federal law exempts from cost sharing—
including pregnant women and Native Americans—are also exempt from both the POWER
Account contribution and copays. LEWIN GROUP, HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0: POWER
ACCOUNT CONTRIBUTION ASSESSMENT 3 (2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Pro
gram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-in
diana-plan-support-20-POWER-acct-cont-assesmnt-03312017.pdf.
67. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra note
61, at 2.
68. Healthy Indiana Plan: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 66, at 8 (For 2018, the
companies are Anthem, CareSource, MDWise, and MHS); In previous years, enrollees had a choice
of only three plans. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., No. 11-W-00237/5, HEALTHY
INDIANA PLAN: SECTION 1115 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2012).
69. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra note
61, at 7–13.
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id.
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patients to get preventive care, recommended preventive services are not
charged against the POWER Account. 72
PLUS members pay a monthly premium that is deposited into the POWER
Account. 73 Premiums range from $12 to $240 annually, due in monthly
installments of $1, $5, $10, $15, or $20 depending on income and family size. 74
Smokers pay fifty percent more. 75 When the HIP 2.0 experiment started,
premiums were pegged to two percent of income. 76 Now, smokers are charged
closer to three percent of income. 77 Moreover, those at the very bottom of the
income scale earning under twenty-two percent FPL, $221 per month for a single
person, pay more than two percent of income because the minimum premium is
a $1 per person per month. 78 Third parties, including employers, not-for-profits
and health care providers may contribute all or part of a person’s POWER
Account premium. 79
HIP PLUS, with its premium requirement, is the only option for people
earning above the FPL ($12,060 a year for a single person) who are not
medically frail. 80 Those earning above poverty who are determined eligible for
HIP, but who do not pay their first month’s premium within sixty days, never
actually get HIP 2.0 coverage, although they can re-start the application process

72. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., MEMBER ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT COVERAGE 27
(2017).
73. Id. at 21.
74. Under the 2015 waiver, fees were pegged to two percent of income rather than being tiered.
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 1, at 17; see also Musumeci et al.,
supra note 63, at 1.
75. See IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN (HIP) 2.0 No. 11-W00296/5, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 21
(2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers
/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down
loads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf; This is the first time
CMS has allowed a state to impose a Medicaid surcharge on smokers. Musumeci, supra note 63,
at 2.
76. Musumeci, supra note 63, at 2.
77. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN (HIP) SECTION 1115
WAIVER EXTENSION APPLICATION 26 (2017). Nonsmokers earning 0–22% of federal poverty level
pay one dollar per month from an income of $0–$221, those with incomes up to 23–50% of the
federal poverty level pay five dollars per month on an income of $222–$50.2, those earning 51%–
75% of poverty, pay $10 per month from a monthly income of $503–$753 per month, those earning
101–138% of poverty pay $20 per month from income ranging from $1,006–$1387, and smokers
ultimately pay 50% more. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN
2018, supra note 61, at 21.
78. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra note
61, at 21.
79. Id. at 23.
80. Id. at 11–12.
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at any time and try again. 81 Those earning above poverty who make their first
month’s premium and then fall behind are dis-enrolled from HIP 2.0 and “locked
out” of HIP 2.0 coverage for six months, at which point they can start the
application process all over again. 82
HIP PLUS is also the preferred option for those earning below the federal
poverty line and those who are medically frail. Once determined eligible for HIP,
these people are automatically enrolled in HIP PLUS pending payment of their
first month’s premium. 83 People who fail to make a premium payment within
sixty days continue to be eligible but are shifted to HIP BASIC with coverage
beginning in month three. 84 Those who make at least one premium payment but
then fall behind on their monthly premiums are switched from PLUS to BASIC
with fewer services and higher copays after a sixty-day grace period. 85
HIP BASIC copays typically make it more expensive than PLUS,
particularly for the medically frail and the very poor. 86 For those with the lowest
incomes who are assessed a flat one-dollar monthly premium and who have
multiple medical appointments or prescriptions, it is less expensive to pay the
twelve-dollar annual PLUS premium than to pay the BASIC copays. Copays are
four dollars for a doctor visit and most outpatient care, four dollars for generic
prescriptions, eight dollars for brand name prescriptions, and seventy-five
dollars for hospital care. 87 One doctor visit and a couple of maintenance
prescriptions easily surpass the twelve-dollar annual premium costs for a PLUS
plan. 88

81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 23.
83. HEALTHY IND. PLAN (HIP) 2.0 No. 11-W- 00296/5, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES WAIVER LIST 1 (2018).
84. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra note
61, at 11.
85. Id. at 2. But see Musumeci et al., An Early Look at Medicaid Expansion Waiver
Implementation in Michigan and Indiana, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1, 13 (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/an-early-look-at-medicaid-expansion-waiver-implementationin-michigan-and-indiana-key-findings/ (explaining that about ten percent of HIP 2.0 enrollees have
been determined to be medically frail); Healthy Indiana Plan: Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 66; see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018,
supra note 61, at 14.
86. See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 37–38.
87. ANTHEM BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD, supra note 66, at 22.
88. Premiums and cost sharing are supposed to be capped at five percent of income on a
quarterly income. Samantha Artiga et al., The Effects of Premiums and Cost Sharing on LowIncome Populations: Updated Review of Research Findings, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2 (June 1,
2017),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-effects-of-premiums-and-cost-sharing-onlow-income-populations-updated-review-of-research-findings/ (last visited Apr.16, 2018); see also
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, supra note 1, at 21 (“[T]he aggregate contributions
paid and debt incurred during a calendar quarter cannot exceed more than 5 percent of the
individual’s quarterly income per 42 CFR 447.78.”).
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The state funds 100% of the $2,500 POWER Account for BASIC members
and 90–99.5% for PLUS members. 89 Patients have no claim to unspent state
POWER Account funds, either at the end of the year or when they leave HIP
2.0. 90
Patients may be able to recoup unspent amounts from their $12–$240 a year
PLUS premiums. Unspent premiums can be carried over to help pay the next
year’s POWER Account premium, but only for members who are enrolled for a
full twelve months and who are up-to-date on the POWER Account premiums. 91
When members leave HIP 2.0 PLUS, they are both entitled to a refund of their
unspent POWER Account premiums and potentially liable for additional
monthly premiums up to their annual premium amount if their POWER Account
spending was more than their monthly contribution. 92
The governor of Indiana has declared, “A decade after it launched, Indiana’s
HIP program has become the national model for a state-led, consumer-driven
healthcare program that meets citizens’ needs, provides choices and improves
lives.” 93 How well does HIP 2.0 fare as consumer driven health care?
IV. TEST DRIVING HIP 2.0: HOW DOES IT FARE UNDER CONSUMER DRIVEN
HEALTH CARE THEORY?
Indiana describes HIP 2.0 and the POWER Accounts as “like an HSA,” but
POWER Accounts are not like HSAs. HSAs are tax-free interest-bearing
accounts owned by the patient. Unused balances can be carried over from year
to year without limit, and the patient can use the HSA to pay for any type of
medical or other expense. 94 POWER Accounts have none of these features.
POWER Accounts are more like an HRA, the employer-established
accounts that attach to employer health plans. 95 The state, not the patient,

89. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2018, supra note
61, at 7–13.
90. See IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., POWER ACCOUNT CONTRIBUTIONS AND
COPAYMENTS INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATIONAL PROTOCOL 10 (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.medi
caid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/HealthyIndiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-Pwr-acct-copay-prtcl-02262015.pdf; 405 IND.
ADMIN. CODE 10-10-5, 10-10-6 (2015).
91. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 90, at 1–2; 405 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1010-5.
92. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 90, at 10–13; 405 IND. ADMIN. CODE
10-10-5, 10-10-6, 10-10-7.
93. Press Release, Gov. Holcomb, Secretary Azar Announce Federal Approval to Continue
and Enhance the Healthy Indiana Plan (Feb. 2, 2018), https://secure.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/PRESSRELEASE-HIP-Approved-February-2-2018.pdf; Verma & Neale, supra note 2. Indiana’s waiver
applications and other descriptions of HIP 2.0 all describe the POWER Account as “similar to an
HSA.” See IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 3, at 6.
94. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text; Francis et al., supra note 15, at 257–58.
95. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

PUTTING THE BRAKES ON CONSUMER DRIVEN MEDICAID

291

establishes, owns and controls the POWER Account. 96 The state limits the
medical expenses that can be reimbursed from the POWER Account, constrains
the POWER Account funds that can be carried over from year-to-year and how
they are used, and restricts what happens to enrollees’ unspent premiums
deposited into the POWER Account. 97
POWER Accounts do not create incentives for patients to engage in
comparison shopping among providers. The POWER Account can only be used
to pay for Medicaid covered services provided by in-network providers. State
law requires HIP 2.0 to pay providers at Medicare rates, 98 and while some
providers may get paid more by Medicare than others, this information is not
made available to HIP 2.0 enrollees. Neither the state nor the HIP 2.0 HMOs
provide patients with information that would allow them to comparison shop
among in-network providers. 99 Furthermore, HIP 2.0 has an active case
management system designed to help patients navigate the health system,
matching patients with providers based on care coordination and replacing
consumer cost consciousness with professional management. 100
POWER Accounts, like HRAs, send weak “skin in the game” signals
because patients do not have much at stake with a POWER Account. The state
solely funds the POWER Account for BASIC members and provides 90–99.5%
of the funding for PLUS members. The patient has no claim to these state dollars.
Unused state money left in the POWER Account reverts to the state when a
person loses HIP coverage or at the end of the year, whichever occurs first. 101
POWER Accounts also send weak “skin in the game” signals because it is
nigh on impossible for people to understand, much less qualify for, the relatively
small amounts of unspent premiums left in their POWER Account when they
96. HRAs are actually reimbursement arrangements, rather than accounts. See Francis et al.,
supra note 15, at 264. The employer only moves money into an account to pay claims as they come
due. Id. No account is pre-funded, which is the case with HSAs. Id.
97. See supra Section IV for a discussion on POWER account operation.
98. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 72, at 12 (HIP 2.0 providers are to be
paid Medicare rates or 130% of Medicaid rates if no comparable Medicare rates).
99. Only one of the four private HMOs that administer HIP 2.0 plans (Anthem) has
information in its enrollee handbook encouraging patients to comparison shop for lower cost
providers. See ANTHEM BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD, supra note 66, at 56. No HMO, however,
provides information to enrollees that would allow them to compare price among network
providers. See id.; Member Handbook for 2018: A Reference Guide to Your Health Care Benefits,
CARESOURCE 8 (2018), https://www.caresource.com/documents/mp-2018-in-member-handbook/;
Healthy Indiana Member Handbook, MDWISE 7 (2014), https://www.mdwise.org/MediaLibraries/
MDwise/Files/For%20Members/eng-mh.pdf; HIP Member Handbook, MHS IND. 8 (2017),
https://www.mhsindiana.com/content/dam/centene/mhsindiana/medicaid/pdfs/2017.
100. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 97–99.
101. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 90, at 9–10 (explaining how PLUS
members may have claim to a share of their premium payments but not the state’s contributions
and how BASIC members can earn premium reductions but do not have claim to any state money
in their POWER Account at the end of the year).
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leave HIP 2.0 coverage or roll-over coverage from year to year. The rules to
“keep” unspent premiums are complicated. 102 Premium refunds are calculated
at the end of the calendar year—not when people leave HIP—making it unlikely
that people will make the connection between their premium refund and their
use of health care. 103 People who lose coverage because of premium nonpayment are assessed a penalty that reduces any premium refund by twenty-five
percent. 104
The rules for rolling over unspent premiums in the POWER Account to help
with the next year’s premium payments are equally as byzantine and confusing.
First, the only people who can roll-over premiums from one year to the next are
people who remain enrolled in HIP 2.0 for a full calendar year and who are upto-date with their premiums. 105 Research on Medicaid enrollment shows that
generally only about sixty to seventy-five percent of Medicaid enrollees actually
stay enrolled in Medicaid for a full year. 106 As discussed in the next section,
churning in and out of HIP coverage has been an even bigger issue in Indiana:
During the first year of HIP 2.0 only about twenty-five percent of enrollees kept
coverage for a full year.
Second, the process for computing and rolling-over unspent POWER
Account premiums at year’s end is so complicated and so slow that the reward
is disconnected from the behavior it is meant to encourage. 107 Here is how it
works: Sarah has a premium of twelve dollars a year, one dollar per month,

102. See JANE B. WISHNER ET AL., MEDICAID EXPANSION, THE PRIVATE OPTION, AND
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS: THE USE OF SECTION 1115 WAIVERS TO IMPLEMENT
MEDICAID EXPANSION UNDER THE ACA 16 (May 2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files
/publication/53236/2000235-Medicaid-Expansion-The-Private-Option-and-Personal-Responsibili
ty-Requirements.pdf.
103. POWER Accounts are activated and funded on a yearly basis, and the patient’s POWER
Account fee is also calculated as an annual contribution with payment required monthly. LEWIN
GROUP, supra note 64, at 11. If a person loses HIP coverage for a month or more, the account is
suspended and reactivated if they regain eligibility. Id. at 8–29. POWER Account funds and charges
are calculated at year’s end to determine if there is a balance remaining. Id. at 84. Indiana’s HIP
2.0 enrollment suffers from a lot of “churn,” meaning people roll on and off coverage from month
to month: only twenty-five percent of enrollees retain coverage for a full year. Id. at 106.
104. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 90, at 10.
105. Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 17.
106. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Insurance Churning Rates for Low-Income Adults Under
Health Reform: Lower Than Expected but Still Harmful for Many, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1816, 1818
(2016).
107. Jake Harper, Indiana’s Model for Medicaid Could Spread—But It’s Not Working for
Everyone, WFYI.ORG (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.wfyi.org/news/articles/indianas-model-formedicaid-could-spreadbut-its-not-working-for-everyone (“According to a survey commissioned by
the state, 40 percent of HIP members had never heard of a POWER account, even though they all
have one. More than half of survey respondents who had been bumped to HIP Basic for missing a
payment said they did not know they needed to make a contribution to their POWER account, or
that they were confused about their membership and plan type.”).
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meaning that her premiums contribute 0.5% of the $2,500 in the POWER
Account. Sarah stays enrolled for twelve continuous months and at the end of
the year Sarah has used $1,500 of her POWER Account, leaving a $1,000
balance. Sarah gets credit for five dollars in unspent premiums, 0.5% of the
funds remaining in the POWER Account, which the state will apply to her next
year’s premium. Sarah obtained her recommended preventive care, so her five
dollars is doubled up to the amount of her next year’s premium. Sarah’s next
year’s premium is twelve dollars per year, one dollar per month. This means
Sarah has ten dollars to roll-over to help pay for the next year’s premiums,
leaving her owing only two dollars for her annual premium for the next year. 108
However, the process for computing and reconciling unspent POWER Account
funds takes three months, which means Sarah remains liable for her full monthly
premium of one dollar a month for the first three months of the next year. By the
time, Sarah’s roll-over amount is calculated and available, she has already paid
three dollars in monthly premiums and lost one dollar of her ten-dollar roll-over
incentive for the year. 109
POWER Accounts are just plain confusing. HIP 2.0 requires that the HMOs
mail all enrollees a monthly statement. 110 The first part records the payment
status and balance due for monthly premiums and copays. 111 The second part
tracks the use of medical services, charges against the POWER Account, and
charges covered by the “traditional” insurance portion of HIP. 112 The POWER
Account statements are even more complicated and confusing than Estimates of
Benefits (EOBs) sent by commercial insurers. 113 The reader can see this for
herself by reading the POWER Account statement attached as Appendix A. The
costs to generate and mail these notices to nearly 400,000 people each month are
substantial. 114 The possibility of error is even more substantial. 115 They certainly
do not help educate consumers, but only serve to add to the confusion.

108. Obtaining preventive care allows enrollees to double their carry over amounts, but only
up to the total amount of their annual PAC fee. ANTHEM BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD, supra note 66,
at 33.
109. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., POWER ACCOUNT, supra note 90, at 1-3; IND.
FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HIP 2.0, INFORMATION ABOUT POWER ACCOUNT CREDITS AND
ROLLOVERS (2017).
110. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., POWER ACCOUNT, supra note 90, at 8–9.
111. Monthly HIP POWER Account Statement, Anthem BlueCross Blue Shield (Jan. 6, 2016)
(attached as Appendix A).
112. Id.
113. For a sample Explanation of Benefits from Blue Cross Blue Shield, see Explanation of
Benefits, BLUECROSS BLUE SHEILD OF N. C., https://www.bcbsnc.com/members/public/forms
/eob/ (last visited May 15, 2018).
114. See Musumeci, et al, supra note 63, at 3 (HIP 2.0 enrolled nearly 397,000 people as of
December 17, 2017).
115. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 90, at 1–3.
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POWER Accounts also add administrative costs to Medicaid. HMOs must
keep track of people’s proper premium assessment amount as their incomes
change during the year. 116 Indiana and the HMOs have struggled to figure out
how to collect small monthly payments of one to twelve dollars from people
who typically do not have bank accounts or access to automatic debit systems. 117
HMOs must also track POWER Account payments, send notices to those who
fall behind, and terminate or change coverage for those who miss two months
payment. The possibility for error in such a complicated system is large.
Finally, the POWER Account premium obligation imposes a confusing and
misleading requirement that has no corollary in the world of consumer driven
health plans, HSAs and HRAs. Indiana calls these payments “POWER Account
contributions” or “PACs,” and claims they are not premiums because they are
deposited in the POWER Account, and, under the state’s stringent and complex
rules, may be available for rollover or return. 118 However, “POWER Account
contributions,” by whatever name, should appropriately be classified as
premiums because they are a condition of eligibility and failure to pay results in
loss of coverage or movement to the less generous and more costly BASIC
coverage. 119
Indiana claims that POWER Account premiums help educate HIP enrollees
about how private insurance works, but POWER Account premiums are unlike
anything in the employer or individual market. In the commercial market people
pay premiums but they are not deposited into their HSAs or HRAs. In fact,
employees are prohibited from contributing to their HRAs. While people may
deposit money into their HSAs, they are not at risk of losing private insurance
coverage if they are unable to fund their HSA. Indiana’s POWER Account
premium is more likely to confuse people about how private insurance, HSAs
and HRAs work than it is to educate them.
While Indiana may claim that paying a monthly POWER Account premium
is good practice for learning to pay a health insurance premium, most working
age Americans are covered by employer sponsored insurance. 120 Employee
premiums are deducted automatically from their pay checks on a pre-tax
116. Id. at 17–18, 20.
117. See Harper, supra note 107.
118. See IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., POWER ACCOUNT, supra note 90, at 10–11.
119. 2018 HIP Waiver Renewal, IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN. 39, 60 (Feb. 20, 2018),
http://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP%20Navigator%20and%20Stakeholder%20Presentation%20
2.16.18.pdf. (Those earning over 100% FPL are terminated from HIP and locked out of coverage
and may not re-enroll for six months. Those earning under 100% or are medically frail are moved
to BASIC coverage with fewer benefits and copayments that must be paid out of pocket and cannot
come from the POWER Account).
120. See Health Insurance Coverage of Adults 19-64, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2016)
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/adults-19-64/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%
22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited May 15, 2018) (fiftynine percent covered by employer sponsored insurance).
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basis. 121 Most working age Americans really do not have to worry about paying
their monthly health insurance premium. It is done for them by their employer.
POWER Accounts are nothing like HSAs. POWER Account premiums are
nothing like HSA contributions. HIP 2.0 is really nothing like HSA plans in the
commercial market. Consumer driven health care theory predicts that HIP 2.0
and POWER Accounts will not be effective at empowering consumers or
reducing unnecessary costs. However, one has to be concerned that PLUS
premiums will create barriers to enrollment and BASIC copays will create
barriers to care.
V. ROAD TESTING HIP 2.0 AND POWER ACCOUNTS: HOW DOES CONSUMER
DRIVEN MEDICAID PERFORM IN THE REAL WORLD?
How is consumer driven Medicaid working in Indiana? Certainly, HIP 2.0’s
Medicaid expansion has brought needed health insurance and health care to poor
and sick Hoosiers. 122 As of December 2017, HIP 2.0 covered nearly 397,000
people. 123 HIP, like every other Medicaid expansion, has reduced the number of
uninsured people in Indiana, providing coverage to many who were uninsured
or had only sporadic coverage. 124 It has increased access to medical care
including primary, preventive and specialty care, and mental health services. 125
HIP 2.0 covers a group of extremely poor and very sick people: A whopping
forty-four percent of HIP 2.0 enrollees have incomes below five percent of
poverty, $603 a year for a single person. 126 Eighty-three percent live below the
121. See Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: How Does the Tax Exclusion for EmployerSponsored Health Insurance Work?, TAX POLICY CRTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST.,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-does-tax-exclusion-employer-sponsoredhealth-insurance-work (last visited May 15, 2018) (explaining a portion of premiums paid by
employees is typically excluded from taxable income).
122. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HIP CMS METRICS 1 (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/down
loads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-2017-dec-metrics-rpt-12192
017.pdf; LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 18–20; Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 10.
123. Musumeci et al., supra note 63, at 3.
124. See Robin Rudowitz et al., Digging Into the Data: What Can We Learn From the State
Evaluation of Healthy Indiana (HIP 2.0) Premiums, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2 (Mar. 2018),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Digging-Into-the-Data-What-Can-We-Learn-from-theState-Evaluation-of-Healthy-Indiana-HIP-20-Premiums (“Between 2013-2016, the nonelderly
uninsured rate dropped by 7.0 percentage points in Indiana, larger than both the national average
decrease of 5.2 % and the 5.5 % decrease in all Medicaid expansion states.”); Musumeci et al.,
supra note 85, at 10. Most people who lose or never got HIP 2.0 coverage became uninsured.
Rudowitz et al. supra note 124, at 4. (In a survey of those who never enrolled or left coverage, fiftynine percent of those who were unable to enroll and fifty-three percent of those who lost coverage
reported being uninsured).
125. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 17; Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 10.
126. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 122; Federal Poverty Guidelines,
FAMILIES USA (Feb. 2017), http://familiesusa.org/product/federal-poverty-guidelines (last visited
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poverty line, $12,060 for a single person. 127 The remaining seventeen percent
earn between 100–138% of poverty, $12,061 to $16,040 for a single person. 128
Almost sixty percent suffer from one or more chronic behavioral or physical
health condition. 129 Twenty-two percent have chronic psychiatric problems,
twenty-one percent have chronic cardiovascular problems, fourteen percent have
chronic skeletal conditions, and thirteen percent have chronic gastrointestinal
illness. 130
Most HIP 2.0 members are enrolled in PLUS plans with a premium
requirement. As of December 2017, about two-thirds of HIP enrollees were in
PLUS plans and one-third were in BASIC plans. 131 HIP enrollees say they prefer
the predictability of PLUS plan premiums over HIP BASIC’s often more
expensive copayments. 132 Advocates and enrollment assisters report that people
are more motivated to pay monthly POWER Account premiums to avoid copays
than to access HIP PLUS’s more generous benefit package. 133
PLUS members are older and sicker than BASIC members. 134 Not
surprisingly, PLUS enrollees also use more health care services than do BASIC
members for most types of services: primary, specialty, preventive and urgent
care. 135 While PLUS members’ greater use of medical care correlates with their
poorer health status and greater health care needs, 136 copays in the BASIC plan
may also be reducing usage among BASIC members.
How well do HIP 2.0, POWER Accounts and consumer driven health care
perform when covering such poor and sick people? Do people understand how
the POWER Accounts work? Do POWER Accounts encourage cost conscious
use of medical services for people who have such serious and ongoing health
care needs while encouraging the use of high quality care? Do the copays in the

Apr. 18, 2018) (100% of FPL for a single person is $12,060). The state has consistently reported
that about half of enrollees are extremely low income. See Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 12
(opining that these high numbers could be the result of administrative challenges of tracking income
for a population that has frequent income changes). See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 20–21
(Explaining the high poverty level numbers may be the result of point in time information rather
than average income for the year, which is used by national surveys).
127. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 122, at 1.
128. Id. Lewin GROUP, supra note 64, at 102 (reporting thirty-seven percent have one to two
chronic conditions and another twenty-four percent have more than two chronic conditions).
129. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 102 (reporting thirty-seven percent have one to two
chronic conditions and another twenty-four percent have more than two chronic conditions).
130. Id. at 19–20, 101.
131. IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS., supra note 122.
132. Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 14 (based on focus group research).
133. Id. at 14–15.
134. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 71.
135. Id. at 96. The only exception is emergency room use, which tends to correlate to income
more than plan enrollment or health status. Id. at 57, 89.
136. Id. at 4.
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BASIC plans create barriers to care? How do HIP enrollees’ use of medical care
compare to that of Medicaid enrollees without a consumer driven health plan?
Do premiums create barriers to enrollment?
HIP 2.0 is being implemented pursuant to a Section 1115 demonstration
waiver. The ACA created new requirements intended to ensure that such
experiments are rigorously evaluated and that the evaluations are publicly
available. 137 Pursuant to these new provisions, Indiana is obliged to conduct
interim and final evaluations of HIP 2.0. The state has contracted with The
Lewin Group for those evaluations and The Lewin Group has produced two
interim evaluations, a first-year evaluation of HIP 2.0 generally and a second
evaluation after twenty-two months that looks specifically at POWER Account
premiums. 138 The final evaluation is due in April 2018. 139
So far, Indiana’s state-level evaluations have disappointed. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has criticized Indiana’s interim reports for their
failure to use comparison groups and for relying on surveys with insufficient
sample sizes and response rates. 140 Much of the data is presented in ways that
tend to obfuscate and hide the ball, making it hard for the public and other
researchers to evaluate the underlying data. 141 The state evaluations do not
address many of the key questions one would like answered to be able to
compare consumer driven Medicaid with traditional Medicaid coverage,
including how enrollment and spending in HIP 2.0 compares with traditional
Medicaid. 142 For example, Indiana’s evaluation will not look at the effect of the
six-month coverage lockout for those who fail to pay their POWER Account
premiums. 143
137. See Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into the Light: Using Section 1115
Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J.L.
POL’Y & ETHICS 213, 215 (2015).
138. Both of these evaluations are required under the Special Terms and Conditions for the
waiver. For a discussion of federal requirements for state evaluations of Section 1115 waivers, see
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-220, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS: EVALUATIONS
YIELDED LIMITED RESULTS, UNDERSCORING NEED FOR CHANGES TO FEDERAL POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES 8–9 (2018).
139. Id. at 9 (“CMS requires states to submit a final evaluation report for review and approval
generally after the end of the demonstration, at which time the agency can work with the state to,
for example, add clarity and disclose the limitations of the evaluation before the final evaluation
report is made public.”).
140. Id. at 13 (“For example, CMS’s contractor [Mathematica Policy Research] raised concerns
about the comparison groups, or lack thereof, used to isolate and measure the effects of the
demonstrations in the Arkansas, California, Indiana, and Maryland evaluations.”).
141. For example, The Lewin Group reports the percentage of total HIP 2.0 enrollees who lost
coverage because of failure to pay premiums. Really, the relevant data point is what percentage of
those with incomes over 100% of poverty who could lose coverage because of failure to pay
premiums did, in fact, lose coverage. See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 44.
142. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 138, at 26.
143. Id. at 29.
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CMS planned to produce two federal multi-state evaluations that would have
addressed some of these key questions using cross-state data. However, CMS’s
efforts have been stymied by Indiana’s refusal to share data with CMS’s
evaluation contractors—allegedly because of privacy concerns. 144 One federal
evaluation was intended to compare outcomes from Indiana’s demonstration to
those for states that expanded Medicaid without a demonstration and to some
states that did not expand Medicaid. It was expected to provide information on
whether monthly POWER Account premiums affect enrollment. 145 The federal
evaluation was also designed to test the impact of POWER Account premiums
on those below and above poverty, and the impact of the lock out period. 146
Despite the lack of vital data about HIP, one thing is clear: HIP PLUS
premiums have created serious barriers to enrollment and coverage in Indiana.
During the first two years of HIP 2.0, more than half (fifty-five percent) of those
required to pay premiums failed to do so and suffered for it. 147 Those with
incomes above poverty either never got covered or got covered and lost their
coverage. Those below poverty were moved to less generous BASIC plans with
copays.
Over half (fifty-one percent) of those with incomes above poverty who were
determined eligible for HIP 2.0 either never enrolled or lost coverage for failure
to pay premiums. 148 In people terms, almost 60,000 people were either disenrolled or not enrolled in HIP 2.0 because of missed POWER Account
premiums: 46,000 never got coverage because they did not make their first
POWER Account premium; 13,550 people enrolled but later lost coverage
because of missed premiums; 9,600 people were dis-enrolled and locked out of
coverage for six months; and 4,000 people were dis-enrolled without a lock
out. 149
Almost sixty percent of people with incomes below poverty who enrolled in
HIP 2.0 were moved from HIP PLUS to HIP BASIC because of premium non144. Id. at 11–12, 24, 26, 29.
145. Id. at 27 (“The multi-state evaluation, for example, is expected to provide information on
whether living in a state that collects monthly contributions from beneficiaries affects the likelihood
of beneficiaries enrolling in Medicaid and how per-beneficiary spending differs between premium
assistance demonstration states and states that have implemented more traditional Medicaid
expansions.”).
146. Id. at 12, 27.
147. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 8 (The study was commissioned by the State of Indiana
as part of the required evaluation of HIP 2.0’s Section 1115 Waiver. It is based upon data from the
first 20 months of the HIP 2.0 program).
148. Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 3; LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 6–8 (During the
first twenty months 57,189 members were dis-enrolled or not enrolled due to non-payment, which
represents fifty-one percent of individuals with income over 100% of poverty determined eligible).
149. Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 3 (Figure 2 illustrates “[a]ffordability and confusion
were the top 2 reasons for premium non-payment reported in Indiana.”); LEWIN GROUP, supra note
66, at 8–10.
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payment. 150 In a two-year period, 287,000 people were moved from PLUS to
BASIC coverage because of missed premiums. 151
Even though HIP enrollees prefer the predictability of POWER Account
premiums over HIP BASIC’s often more expensive copayments, 152 the premium
requirement thwarts and confounds them. People report the chief reasons they
missed paying POWER Account premiums were they “could not afford to pay”
or “confusion about payment policies.” 153 Unaffordability tops the list: Fortyfour percent of those who lost coverage, twenty-two percent of those who never
made a premium payment, and thirty-four percent of those moved to BASIC
plans because of a missed premium say they missed payments because they
could not afford it. 154 Confusion over the premium policies came in second:
twenty-seven percent of those who never enrolled, seventeen percent of those
who lost coverage, and seventeen percent of those who were moved to BASIC
failed to pay their premiums because they were confused about the payment
rules. 155 Another twenty-five percent of those moved to BASIC did not realize
that a premium was even required. 156
People need help to meet their premium payments. One in four HIP 2.0
PLUS enrollees report getting help to pay their premiums. 157 Most people got
help from a family member, eighty-seven percent. Twenty-four percent got help
from a friend. 158 Very few people reported receiving help from an employer,
charity, or religious organization, even though Indiana has encouraged
employers, not-for-profits and providers to provide help. 159

150. Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 3; LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 8–10 (finding fiftyseven percent were moved from HIP Basic to Plus).
151. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 8 (finding an exact total of 286,914 people).
152. Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 14 (Based on focus group research of different HIP
stakeholders. “Advocates and enrollment assisters reported that beneficiaries appeared to be more
motivated to pay monthly premiums based on the opportunity to avoid point-of-service copayments
than by the ability to obtain additional benefits like vision and dental available in HIP Plus, although
those services were cited as valued by beneficiaries as well.”).
153. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 19–20. (Respondents reported confusion as to the amount
due, the date due, and to whom the payment was due); Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 4. (“The
top two reasons cited by people who never enrolled in or lost HIP 2.0 coverage were affordability
and confusion about the payment process.”).
154. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 19–20; Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 4.
155. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 19–20; Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 4 (“Another
22 percent of those who never made an initial payment and 17 percent of those who were
disenrolled for missing a payment said that they were confused about how much, when or where to
pay.”).
156. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 19–20; Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 4.
157. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 15 (“About 24 percent of HIP Plus Member respondents
[ ] indicated that they received help from a third party.”); Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 4.
158. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 15; Rudowitz et al., supra note 124, at 4.
159. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 66, at 15 (“Very few members reported receiving help from an
employer … or a charity or religious organization.”).
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The POWER Accounts also confuse people. In focus groups organized by
Kaiser Family Foundation, HIP enrollees, advocates and providers all said they
were confused about how POWER Accounts work, their purpose and the
monthly statements. 160 Some enrollees thought the $2,500 starting balance on
the POWER Account card was a cap on services. 161 The POWER Account card
is a debit card that is supposed to be presented to the provider at the time of
service for payment, but many enrollees do not understand this and some
providers refuse to accept the POWER Account debit card, preferring to use the
traditional billing and reimbursement process. 162 Indiana starting using POWER
Accounts with HIP 1.0 in 2007. 163 Almost ten years later people still did not
understand how they work.
Focus group participants also reported being confused by the monthly
POWER Account statements. 164 As one participant said, “When I get those
statements…I’m not really understanding what it’s all about…I mean you’re
seeing all your services, but I really don’t understand the POWER Account, what
it’s all about and so on. It’s hard to understand.” 165
It seems unlikely that POWER Accounts have made enrollees more costconscious consumers of medical care since most HIP 2.0 enrollees do not even
realize they have a POWER Account. In a survey conducted as part of Indiana’s
one-year evaluation, only about one-third of BASIC members and less than onehalf of PLUS members surveyed reported knowing they had a POWER
Account. 166 Only ten percent of BASIC members and nineteen percent of PLUS
members reporting reading their monthly POWER Account statement. 167
160. Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 15.
161. Id. (The authors posit this “could inhibit, rather than encourage the receipt of necessary
preventive
services.”).
162. Id. at 15–16.
163. Hermer & Lenihan, supra note 58, at 308.
164. Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 15.
165. Id. at 16 (quoting an Indiana Medicaid enrollee). The reader can see a POWER Account
statement and decide for herself if it is confusing. A monthly POWER Account statement is
reproduced in Appendix A, with personal information deleted.
166. See LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 65, 66 tbl. 2.1.2. Among Basic members surveyed,
forty-six percent had heard of a POWER Account and, of those, seventy-six percent said they had
a POWER Account, meaning that thirty-five percent of all enrollees responded that they had a
POWER Account. See id. Among PLUS enrollees sixty-six percent had heard of POWER Accounts
and, of those, seventy-two percent said they had a POWER Account, meaning that only forty-eight
percent of PLUS enrollees were aware they had a POWER Account. See id.
167. See id. at 65–66. Indiana’s HIP 2.0 Waiver Extension Application claimed the POWER
Accounts were producing more cost-conscious consumers because “40% of HIP Plus and 30% of
HIP Basic members reported checking their POWER Account balance monthly.” IND. FAMILY &
SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 90, at 5 (“[T]he POWER account has helped engage members
and educate them about the cost of healthcare in a way that traditional Medicaid is unable to do.”).
However, this misstates the survey data which reports “[a]mong members who reported having a
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No data is yet available to evaluate how well the POWER Account roll-over
incentive is working, but as of 2016 only twenty-five percent of HIP 2.0
participants had been enrolled for a full twelve months and qualified to take
advantage of the roll-over incentives. 168 As of August 2016, few enrollees,
advocates or providers understood the roll-over incentives structure. 169 Focus
groups members opined that gift cards would be a better incentive to reward
healthy behavior (like getting primary care) than the roll-over of POWER
Account funds to reduce future premiums. 170
How is consumer driven Medicaid working in Indiana? Indiana has failed to
produce evidence to support its claims that HIP 2.0 encourages Medicaid
enrollees to become better consumers of health care, helps familiarize members
with how commercial health insurance works, or encourages continuous
Medicaid enrollment. Instead, the available data paints a picture of HIP 2.0 as a
program rife with confusion and administrative complexity.
Indiana’s own data confirms that PLUS premiums have created substantial
barriers to enrollment and coverage. More than half of those eligible for HIP
coverage either lost coverage or were moved to more costly, less comprehensive
BASIC plans because of their failure to comply with the premium requirement.
Nearly 60,000 people lost coverage and another 300,000 were moved to BASIC
plans.
VI. CONCLUSION
HIP 2.0 and POWER Accounts are a pale imitation of HSAs and consumer
driven health care. While good evaluative data is limited, the POWER Accounts
seem to be creating more confusion that consumer empowerment. What is clear
is that POWER Account premiums have created barriers to coverage and
disruptions in coverage unheard of in traditional Medicaid.
HHS was wrong when it used its Section 1115 authority to grant Indiana a
waiver to operate HIP 2.0 as an experimental project that furthers the objectives
of the Medicaid Act. Indiana’s experiment has proved that consumer driven
Medicaid—that relies on premiums—suppresses enrollment, creating barriers to
coverage and care.

POWER Account, 40 percent of HIP Plus and 30 percent of HIP Basic members reported checking
their POWER Account balance monthly.” LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 3 (emphasis added).
168. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 64, at 1.
169. Musumeci et al., supra note 85, at 1 (“Beneficiaries in our focus groups as well as
advocates and providers in both states did not demonstrate a clear understanding of the policies
associated with these models. This feedback shows that these models are hard to understand even
in Indiana, a state with the long-standing experience in health accounts.”).
170. Id. at 3 (explaining gift cards were more appealing because they could be used to meet
more immediate needs).

